Western strategic constraints in the war on Iran

Writing for UnHerd, in an article titled Boots-on-the-ground is Trump’s best option, Wolfgang Munchau elaborates on a logical argument in favour of committing to the war in Iran:

[…] Unlike Russia, Iran is not a nuclear power, and on conventional forces alone the US surely has the military capability to theoretically defeat the regime. Whatever we might think about what is good or bad, right or wrong, it would therefore make sense for Trump to resume the war, and even to put boots on the ground if that is what’s required. It is what the logic of war dictates.

Wolfgang’s position is coherent yet lacks lateral thinking of the sort necessary in matters of strategy. In absolute terms the USA has more resources than Iran and will thus prevail in an all-out war. Though this is a simplistic representation of the case. What is pertinent is the spacetime of war, the trade-offs inherent to each decision, and the status quo ex post for the winning side.

Even a superpower has to think in terms of the economy of choices within fixed time frames and even a superpower can be a loser long-term after winning a war in the short run. Every war is costly in tangible and intangible ways. It is not enough to calculate how one can win on a single front. They must rather consider whether they can retain their position in international affairs altogether. 20th century history is enough to teach us that mighty empires, like the British and the French, can still be swept into the dustbin of history shortly after prevailing in a major war.

For America to muster the forces necessary for a ground invasion in Iran, it not only needs months of preparation, but also to shift its attention away from other parts of the planet. For example, military assets in East Asia will have to be moved to the Middle East. A power vacuum is created in the process. Other actors, such as China, may then find an opening to create a fait accompli that strengthens their position thenceforth.

US forces moving away from places like South Korea then raises questions about the credibility of American security guarantees as well as the political commitment behind them. Given the isolationist mood in the States and the fact that President Trump was elected on an unequivocal anti-war platform (well, at least rhetorically), affected countries will conclude that Americans are jaded and unwilling to fight on all fronts.

It does not stop there. A full-scale war in Iran creates new realities on the demand for military hardware. The war effort will absorb as much as necessary, while there will still be a need to maintain inventories at satisfactory levels for the ongoing promotion of American/Western interests. One immediate knock-on effect is that it will no longer be viable to send arms to Ukraine, Israel, or elsewhere, with whatever implications that has for those countries.

Governments that are supportive of Iran will be prudent to maximise the costs for the Americans. Russia and China can provide arms and intelligence, much in the same way that the entirety of NATO is involved in the Ukraine war.

The Europeans lack the capacity to bolster arms production over the short-term. Plus, they are focused on their proxy war with Russia. Public opinion in Europe would not support sending troops to the Middle East and would likely not even have the appetite to continue the war effort vis-Ă -vis the Russians in the face of mounting economic pressures.

As the debacle of the UK’s Labour party in the recent local elections has demonstrated, Western governing parties can quickly lose their grip on power if they do not perform well on domestic affairs. Political elites think they can play chess on the world stage, when in reality they have to pay attention to what is happening at home.

Economic hardship has been the reality for a long time and will only worsen over the medium-term. There is little chance that people will support open-ended military campaigns under the vague promise of better things to come in some indeterminate future. That can, in principle, lead to radical changes domestically (e.g. a far-right president in France) which would be the death knell of the liberal world order.

And I have not even considered the practicalities of a ground war in Iran. What kind of forces does that unleash? The Iranians will be fighting for the honour of their homeland, while the invaders will be operating under the eternal shame of imperialistic arrogance. With Iran cornered, who is to say that they will not retaliate by destroying desalination plants in their neighbouring countries? An ill-considered war will then quickly turn into a humanitarian catastrophe for the wider region.

Are Europeans prepared to deal with the indubitably massive refugee crisis that will be hitting them? If the waves of refugees from Syria provided the impetus for the recrudescence of the far-right across the continent, I prefer not to think what an even bigger influx of refugees would bring about. It will not be pretty. Rising xenophobia, which would be indistinguishable from Islamophobia, could then trigger fanaticism on the side of radical Islamist groups across Europe. An all-out war in Iran then entails the non-trivial risk of asymmetric threats throughout the Western world.

In short, it is easy to argue which contestant wins in a hypothetical cage fight. However, politics are not reducible to a melee encounter. The world is a complex place. It is incredibly hard to be a responsible statesman. President Trump continues with his questionable antics on social media, though one can only hope that he understands the disastrous consequences of recklessness.

The multipolar international order is the new normal. What remains to be determined is whether the Westerners have gotten the memo or continue to throw good money after bad.